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1. Summary of future population change 
The following summary is taken from the Key Findings of the 2015 Revision of the UN Population 
Division’s World Population Prospects (United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs Population Division, 2015) and is purely to provide an overview of future population 
change. The global development challenges of future population change are broad and a 
comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this pilot learning journey. This report instead 
focusses on the areas highlighted by DFID at this stage of the journey with the addition of 
addressing the fertility challenge.  
In July 2015, the world population reached 7.3 billion people. This is an increase of one billion 
since 2003 and two billion since 1990. The world population continues to grow though more 
slowly than in the past. Ten years ago, world population was growing by 1.24 percent per year. In 
2015, it is growing by 1.18 percent per year. 50.4 percent of the world was male and 49.6 
percent was female. The median age of the global population was 29.6 years. Twenty-six 
percent were under the age 15, 62 percent 15-59 years and 12 percent 60 years or over. Sixty 
per cent of the global population lives in Asia (4.4 billion), 16 per cent in Africa (1.2 billion), 10 per 
cent in Europe (738 million), 9 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean (634 million), and the 
remaining 5 per cent in Northern America (358 million) and Oceania (39 million) (Figure 1). China 
(1.4 billion) and India (1.3 billion) remain the two largest countries of the world, both with more 
than 1 billion people, representing 19 and 18 percent of the world’s population, respectively. 
Figure 1. Total population by major area 
                      
                     Source: UN Population Division 2015 Revision wall chart 
Africa is the fastest-growing major area with more than half of global population growth between 
2015 and 2050 expected to occur here (1.3 billion additional people). Between 2015 and 2050, 
the populations of 28 African countries are projected to more than double. By 2050, Africa’s 
share of the global population is expected to increase to 25 percent and will be the only major 
area still experiencing substantial population growth. Asia is projected to be the second largest 
contributor to future global population growth, adding 0.9 billon people between 2015 and 2050. 
The medium variant projection assumes that fertility will fall from 4.7 children per women in 2010-
2015 to 3.1 in 2045-2050. Population growth remains especially high in the group of 48 countries 
designated as the least developed countries, of which 27 are in Africa. Amongst the ten largest 
countries in the world, Nigeria’s population (currently the seventh largest in the world) is growing 
the most rapidly. By 2050, Nigeria is expected to become the third largest country in the world. 
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The concentration of population growth in the poorest countries will challenge governments in 
sustainable development.  
The global population is expected to reach 8.5 billion (95% CI 8.4 to 8.6 billion) in 2030 and 9.7 
billion in 2050, according to the medium projection variant. Global population is expected to 
continue to grow until 2050, even if the decline in fertility accelerates. However, projected total 
population growth is highly dependent on fertility, a relatively small change in fertility behaviour 
can generate large differences in projected total population over several decades. In the 
medium-variant projection, it is assumed that global fertility will decline from 2.5 children per 
woman in 2010-2015 to 2.4 in 2025-2030 to 2.25 in 2045-2050. However, for countries with high 
fertility (9 percent of the world’s population where an average woman has 5 or more children over 
her lifetime) there is significant uncertainty in the projection of fertility, even over the next 15 
years. Of the 21 high-fertility countries, 19 are in Africa and 2 are in Asia. The largest are Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Afghanistan. Fertility 
has declined in almost all major areas of the world. In Africa, where fertility levels are highest of 
any major area, total fertility has fallen from 4.9 children per woman in 2005-2010 to 4.7 children 
per woman in 2010-2015. A decline was also observed in Asia, Oceania, Latin America and the 
Caribbean and Northern America. A slight increase was observed in Europe.  
Adolescent childbearing, has fallen in most countries, but remains high among some major 
areas: the adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15-19) in 2010-2015 was highest 
in Africa, at 98 per 1,000 women, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean at 67 per 1,000. 
The slowdown in population growth brought about by a reduction in fertility is associated with 
population ageing. Population ageing (as fertility declines and life expectancy rises) is occurring 
throughout the world. In 2015, there were 901 million people aged 60 or over (12 percent of the 
global population). Rapid ageing will occur in all major areas so that by 2050, all major areas of 
the world except Africa will have nearly a quarter or more of their populations aged 60 or over. 
The number of older persons in the world is projected to be 1.4 billion by 2030 and 2.1 billion by 
2050. All major areas of the world are projected to experience significant population ageing, 
including Africa which has the youngest age distribution. However, Asia is expected to 
experience the highest proportion of the increase (66 percent). The number of persons aged 80 
or over is projected to more than triple by 2050. 
Global life expectancy is 68 years for men and 73 years for women in 2010-2015. Globally, life 
expectancy is expected to rise from 70 years in 2010-2015 to 77 years in 2045-2050. Africa is 
projected to have a life expectancy of 70 years in 2045-2050. The least developed countries 
have experienced a six-year average gain in life expectancy from 56 years in 2000-2005 to 62 
years in 2010-2015, roughly double the increase recorded in the rest of the world. Whilst 
significant differences in life expectancy across major areas and income groups are projected to 
continue, they are expected to diminish by 2045-2050.  
Population ageing is projected to have a profound effect on the number of workers per retiree, as 
measured by the Potential Support Ratio (PSR), defined as the number of people aged 20 to 64 
divided by the number of people aged 65 and over. Currently Africa has 12.9 people aged 20 to 
54 for every person aged 65 or above, Asia has PSRs of 8.0, Latin America and the Caribbean 
7.6, Oceania 4.8 and Europe and Northern America at or under 4. Japan, at 2.1 has the lowest 
PSR in the world. By 2050, seven Asian countries, 24 European countries, and four countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to have PSRs below 2. 
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Populations in many regions are still young. In Africa, children under age 15 account for 41 
percent of the population in 2015 and young persons aged 15 to 24 account for a further 19 
percent. Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, which have seen greater declines in fertility, 
have smaller percentages of children (26 and 24 per cent, respectively) and similar percentages 
of youth (17 and 16 per cent, respectively). In total, these three regions are home to 1.7 billion 
children and 1.1 billion young persons in 2015. 
The under-five mortality rate decreased by more than 20 percent in 156 countries or areas 
between 2000-2005 and 2010-2015. A 20 percent or more reduction was recorded in Africa (42 
out of 57 countries or areas), Asia (43 out of 51), Europe (39 out of 40), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (24 out of 38), and Oceania (8 out of 13). Absolute declines were particularly large in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (142 to 99 per 1,000 live births) and in the least developed countries (125 to 
86 per 1,000 live births). 
HIV/AIDS-related adult mortality has peaked in most countries mostly due to the widespread 
availability of antiretroviral treatment. However, the impact of the epidemic is still evident. Life 
expectancy in Southern African, the region with the highest prevalence of the disease, is not 
expected to return to the level where it was in the early 1990s until 2030.  
International migration is a much smaller component of population change than births or deaths. 
However, in some countries and areas the impact of migration on population size is significant, 
including in countries that send or receive proportionately large numbers of economic migrants or 
those affected by refugee flows. Overall, between 1950 and 2015, the major areas of Europe, 
Northern America and Oceania have been net receivers of internal migration, while Africa, Asia 
and Latin and the Caribbean have been net senders, with the volume of net migration generally 
increasing over time. From 2000 to 2015, average annual net migration to Europe, Northern 
America and Oceania averaged 2.8 million persons per year. When countries are grouped by 
income rather than geography, the numbers are higher. From 2000 to 2015, average annual net 
migration to high-income countries averaged 4.1 million persons per year from lower and middle-
income countries. In the future, net migration is projected to be a major contributor to population 
growth in many high-income countries. Between 2015 and 2050, total births in the group of high-
income countries are projected to exceed deaths by 20 million, while the net gain in migrants is 
projected to be 91 million. Thus, in the medium variant, net migration is projected to account for 
82 per cent of population growth in the high-income countries. Several high-income and middle-
income countries in the “global south” have also been attracting migrants in larger number for 
several years too. Between 2015 and 2050, the top net receivers of international migrants (more 
than 100,000 annually) are projected to be the United States of America, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Germany, the Russian Federation and Italy. The countries projected to have 
net emigration of more than 100,000 annually include India, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan and 
Mexico. 
The 50
th
 session of the Commission on Population Development was held on 3 to 7 April 2017. 
Eliya Zulu from the African Institute for Development Policy (AFIDEP) gave a Keynote speech on 
Changing age structures and sustainable development in youthful societies 
(http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2017/documents/Presentati
on_EliyaZulu.pdf). He discussed the slower demographic transition in Africa compared to Asia 
and Latin America. Most populations in sub-Saharan Africa are dominated by children and youth, 
although populations in Southern and Northern Africa are older than the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa due to steady fertility declines. The window of opportunity for harnessing the demographic 
dividend has opened and already peaked in some African countries highlighting the limited 
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period to take advantage of a youth bulge before it turns into an old-population bulge. Eliya Zulu 
proposes that to optimise linkages between youthful populations and sustainable development 
family planning must be prioritised. Teenage marriages and childbearing must not be tolerated at 
all anywhere and on-going interventions to reduce child mortality to enhance fertility decline and 
improve life expectance at birth needs to be stepped-up. Educations systems must be reformed 
to the prioritise transferable skills, innovation, science and technology and entrepreneurship. 
Universal secondary education must be embraced and access to tertiary education increased to 
“unleash” the power of youth in driving socioeconomic transformation. The capacity to generate 
quality jobs and livelihoods for the current work force and upcoming working-age bulge needs to 
be enhanced to optimise inclusive sustainable development. This includes empowering women 
into employment and other stable livelihoods outside the home. Rania Antonopoulos, Director of 
the Gender Equality and the Economy Programme at the Levy Institute, Bard College, gave a 
Keynote speech on Changes in age structure and sustainable development in ageing societies.  
2. A historical sketch of population concerns and research 
findings in poor countries 
Concerns about the economic effect of rapid population growth, originating with Malthus in the 
late 18
th
 century, re-surfaced in the middle of the last century when it became clear that an era of 
unprecedented, rapid increase in the populations of developing countries had started. In 1958, a 
hugely influential book on India’s demography and economy by Coale and Hoover concluded 
that India’s development was jeopardised by rapid population growth and its attendant age 
structure with high and rising child dependency ratios (Coale & Hoover, 1958). Badly needed 
investment in agricultural modernisation and industrialisation was being diverted to address the 
immediate needs for more schools, health care and infrastructure. Together with concerns about 
longer term sustainability of increasing population and consumption and more apocalyptic 
warnings about resource depletion and food shortages (Ehrlich, 1968; Meadows, Meadows, 
Randers, & Behrens III, 1972), this seminal work provided the economic rationale for national 
and international support for family planning programmes, which burgeoned in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
Subsequently, the Coale-Hoover thesis attracted empirical challenges. No straightforward 
relationship between national population growth and per capita output was observed (Kuznets, 
1967); the relative size of the school age population did not appear to influence the share of 
national income allocated to education (Schultz, 1987); and no confirmation was found that 
savings and investment were adversely affected by high youth dependency ratios (Kelley, 1988). 
Influential scholars argued that, far from being an obstacle to development, increased population 
stimulated innovation and productivity (Boserup, 1965; Simon, 1981). The mood among many 
economists of scepticism, or even neutrality, about the consequences of high fertility and 
population growth was captured by the cautious and nuanced conclusions of the 1986 US 
National Academy report on population (National Research Council, 1986). 
In the past two decades, the evidence on demographic-economic relations has tilted yet again 
towards support of Coale and Hoover. These more recent analyses have the advantage over 
earlier studies in access to a longer time series of data and advances in statistical modelling. 
Unlike many early studies that took population growth as a unitary concept, demographic factors 
are represented in a more detailed and richer manner, distinguishing, for instance, between size, 
density, age structure, fertility and mortality. The key result of these studies concerns the 
potential boost to output and incomes of fertility decline, acting through its link to age structure. 
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Fertility decline reduces the child dependency ratio and ushers in an era of several decades 
when the working age population continues to grow because of the legacy of past high fertility. 
This era, dubbed the demographic “bonus” or “dividend”, is temporary, because it is inevitably 
followed by a decline in the ratio of workers to dependents as the population ages. 
The benefit of high ratio of workers to dependent young and old is obvious but its effect can be 
greatly magnified by the enhanced opportunity for savings and investment, both in higher quality 
education, thereby raising human capital, and also physical capital, thereby facilitating 
agricultural intensification and industrialisation. Modelling of data from 86 countries with market 
economies suggests that demographic change (excluding mortality) accounted for about 20% of 
increases in per capita output over the period 1960-95 (Kelley & Schmidt, 2005). The effect of 
the demographic dividend is conditional on the existence of effective institutions for saving and 
investment and on macro-economic policies. These conditions were particularly favourable in 
East Asia (and Western Europe) with correspondingly larger estimated impacts of demography 
on economic growth than in South America where conditions were less favourable (Bloom, 
Canning, & Malaney, 2000; Kelley & Schmidt, 2005). Because of hitherto modest declines in 
fertility, sub-Saharan Africa is yet to experience the era of favourable demographic change and it 
remains uncertain whether countries in this region will benefit to the same extent as in East Asia, 
partly because of historically low savings rates (Eastwood & Lipton, 2011). 
A large body of household studies broadly supports the new macro-economic results. A strong 
correlation between the number of children in a household and poverty has been observed for 
decades. Children with many siblings tend to be less well educated and less well nourished, 
though these associations are context-specific, being weaker in Africa probably because of 
diffusion of the costs of children among extended lineages (Green & Merrick, 2005). Causal 
interpretation, however, has been problematic. Do the poor choose to have larger families than 
the less poor, because of perceived advantages of future labour contributions or as a form of 
security in old age? Or is their poverty in part a consequence of high fertility? Twin studies 
minimize problems of causality and these suggest that large family sizes do impact negatively on 
the education and health of children (Rosenzweig & Wolpen, 1980; Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009). 
Other social scientists, including demographers, tend to stress lack of choice and are more ready 
than economists to interpret high fertility as a barrier to the escape from poverty. The large body 
of survey evidence on unwanted childbearing supports the latter view. Unwanted childbearing is 
invariably more common among the poor than the rich. Sound reasons can account for this 
relationship. The poor have less information about contraception, greater misgivings about its 
use and restricted access to service. 
Powerful confirmation that the poor benefit from fertility-reduction comes from the quasi-
experiment in Matlab, a poor district in a poor country, Bangladesh. Starting in 1977, half the 
area received high-quality intensive family planning services while the other half continued to 
receive routine government services. Fertility fell faster and earlier in the treatment area than the 
comparison area though by 1996 the gap had closed. Among the long-term consequences of this 
difference was better education of children, greater asset accumulation, and greater use of 
preventive health services in the treatment than in the comparison area (Joshi & Schultz, 2007). 
Most of the positive effects of fertility decline and associated population change on economic 
development unfold over decades and, for this reason, may be unattractive to political leaders 
with short term horizons. Analyses by the Futures Group address this concern by demonstrating 
that family planning also can bring short-term gains (Moreland & Talbird, 2006). For 16 African 
countries the costs of meeting unmet need for family planning were assembled; the number of 
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unintended pregnancies and births averted by family planning were estimated; and the savings 
represented by these averted births in meeting MDGs by 2015 calculated. The average 
estimated benefit/cost ratio for the 16 countries was an impressive 3.7. The largest savings were 
in primary schooling (with an obvious lag of five years) and in obstetric care with additional 
savings in immunization, provision of bed nets for malaria control and improvement in water 
supply and sanitation. The effect of preventing unintended births on absolute poverty may also 
be considerable but were not included in the analysis. 
3. Fertility 
Fertility decline in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa has started later and proceeded more 
slowly than in countries in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. The future pattern that 
fertility takes will determine population growth and age structure shifts not only in this region, but 
also globally. 
While nearly half of the world’s population lives in countries where fertility is below two births per 
woman, implying population decline in the long term in the absence of migration, nearly all DFID 
priority countries have fertility well above replacement level. The exceptions are Bangladesh, 
India, Nepal, Lebanon, and South Africa where fertility is now close to two births per woman. Half 
of DFID priority countries are in sub-Saharan Africa and most have high fertility. The UN medium 
projection assumes a continuation of the gentle fertility decline in Africa from a little under 5 births 
per woman to 3 births by mid-century. Under this scenario, the annual number of births will rise 
from 35 million in 2015 to 53 million by 2050. The maternal mortality ratio, deaths per 100,000 
births, is about 500 in Africa, far higher than in other regions and only about half of deliveries 
have the advantage of a skilled attendance. The 49% increase in the annual number of births per 
year over the next 35 years will certainly impede progress in improvement of maternal health. 
However, the UN projections may be too pessimistic. The attitudes of African leaders have 
become more positive towards promotion of family planning, in part because of the demographic 
dividend narrative, which has been endorsed by both the World Bank and the IMF. Recent 
successes in reducing fertility in Ethiopia and Rwanda have profound implications for the region. 
Ethiopia’s population is estimated to be about 100 million, the second most populous country in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Despite rapid growth in GDP in the past 10 years, it remains one of the 
world’s poorest countries and is the world’s largest recipient of international food aid. School 
enrolments have improved but adult educational levels are low. Half of women of reproductive 
age have received no schooling and the percentage with secondary schooling is exceptionally 
low. 
Despite these disadvantages, the country has achieved an impressive degree of demographic 
modernisation. For instance, life expectancy improved by close to 16 years between 1990 and 
2013, whereas the gain for Africa was only about six years. Similarly, fertility fell from seven 
births per woman in the early 1990s to 4.6 births in 2010-15, a drop of 35% compared with a 
drop over the same period of 18% for the entire region. 
Strong policies and programmes can take much of the credit for these stunning achievements 
(Halperin, 2014). The 1993 population policy set explicitly demographic goals of reducing fertility 
to four births and raising contraceptive use to 44% by 2015. In 2004, the abortion law was 
liberalised. A cadre of over 30,000 mainly female community-based health and family planning 
workers was trained for one year and posted back to their own localities. One lesson from 
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Ethiopia, like that of Bangladesh in the 1980s, is that major progress towards low mortality and 
fertility can be made in conditions of poverty and illiteracy given political will and programmatic 
efficiency. It also demonstrates that childbearing can fall sharply in a very poorly educated 
society. The claim is often made that radical reproductive change is dependent on the 
achievement of secondary schooling for a high proportion of adult women. While female 
education is highly conducive for fertility decline, the Ethiopia example shows that it is not a 
precondition. 
Rwanda, a much smaller and more densely populated country than Ethiopia, is placed at position 
163 out of 188 on the human development index, the same as Uganda but slightly higher than 
Ethiopia at position 174. The country adopted a pronatalist stance in the aftermath of the 
genocide but in 2003, the policy changed to the goal of reducing population growth and, as in 
Ethiopia, a strong emphasis was given to outreach family planning services. Between 2005 and 
2014/5, the percent of married women using a modern contraceptive method rose from 10% to 
48% and fertility fell from six to a little over four births per woman, an astonishingly rapid 
transformation. 
The key lesson from Ethiopia and Rwanda appears to be that determined government initiatives 
can bring about rapid reproductive change as part of a wider agenda of health improvements, 
educational expansion and economic vibrancy. Both political regimes run relatively efficient 
administrations that are capable of mass mobilisation and implementation of effective nationwide 
programmes. Both are autocratic, with little tolerance for opposition, and it remains uncertain 
whether political evolution towards greater inclusiveness and freedom of expression will occur. 
The civil insurrection in Ethiopia in October 2016 is certainly a warning sign that a more inclusive 
approach is needed. Nevertheless, the experience of these two countries is relevant to the more 
secure and competent regimes in Africa. 
Gerland et al. compares the pace of fertility decline for Ethiopia and Nigeria, the two most 
populous countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and its implications for their future populations 
(Gerland, Biddlecom, & Kantorová, 2017). Figure 2 below shows that both countries reached a 
maximum fertility level in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, Nigeria’s fertility decline has 
been consistently slower than Ethiopia’s resulting in a current total fertility of 4.6 births per 
woman in Ethiopia and 5.7 in Nigeria. 
 
Figure 2. Observed decline in total fertility from 1950 to 2010-2015, predicted decline, and 
period of maximum TFR and maximum decline for Ethiopia and Nigeria.  
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Source: UN Population Division World Population Prospects 2015 Revision and computations by authors Gerland et al. 
2017. 
 
The authors then modelled fertility scenarios for 2015 to 2100 to examine the impact on 
population size if fertility decline accelerates at a faster pace through fertility transition than 
currently projected. The model is based on the fertility transition experience of 21 countries which 
showed a similar pattern of accelerated decline in fertility despite disparate institutional, social, 
economic and cultural contexts; and could therefore apply to a region that also has distinctive 
and diverse contexts. The following figure 3 shows the implications for Ethiopia and Nigeria. 
Median projected total fertility by 2045-2050 would decline from 2.3 (baseline) to 2.0 (accelerated 
decline) in Ethiopia and from 3.6 (baseline) to 2.6 (accelerated decline) in Nigeria. This 
accelerated fertility scenario has greater implications in Nigeria where the current pace of fertility 
decline has been much slower than in Ethiopia; the projected population would grow from 99 
million in 2015 to median 182 million by 2100 in Ethiopia, compared to 234 million under the 
baseline scenario, and from 182 million in 2015 to 466 million by 2100, compared to 737 million 
under the baseline scenario.  
 
Figure 3. Probabilistic fertility projections (median and 80 percent prediction intervals) for 
two scenarios: baseline and accelerated fertility decline in Ethiopia and Nigeria. 
 
 10 
                              
 
Source: UN Population Division World Population Prospects 2015 Revision and computations by authors. 
Applying an accelerated pace of fertility decline to countries at earlier stages of transition 
illustrates the substantial impact on future population growth of other possible patterns of fertility 
decline in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Bongaarts 2016 writes that within a decade, women everywhere should have access to quality 
contraceptive services, even in rural areas of poor countries to reduce rapid population growth 
and high birth rates (Bongaarts, 2016). Where legal, safe abortion services should be made 
available. Education of women and men through media campaigns and collaboration with 
community leaders should address other challenges such as incorrect rumours about side effects 
and conservative social attitudes. These efforts can be led by governments but Bongaarts 
highlights that results are better obtained when services are provided through multiple ways 
including private commercial providers and non-governmental organisations. Substantially 
increased funds are required to achieve these aims. The Kaiser Family Foundation track donor 
government spending on family planning following the 2012 London Summit on Family Planning 
(Wexler & Kates, 2015). Bongaarts ends by proposing that family planning must be reclassified 
as a development intervention to raise its priority as the proportion of ODA allocated to family 
planning should be increased. 
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4. Population age structure 
The young population  
The youth bulge is a common phenomenon in many developing countries, and in particular in the 
least developed countries.  A variety of definitions have been used, including the percent of 
people aged 15 to 24 (or 29) years in the total population, total adult population or working age 
population (15 to 64 years). It is often due to a stage of development where a country achieves 
success in reducing infant mortality but the fertility rate is still high. Despite a marked decline in 
child mortality in SSA, fertility rates remain high where women have on average 4.7 children – 
twice the number in South Asia (Watkins & Quattri, 2016). Youth bulges persist until a couple of 
decades after the onset of fertility decline which acts initially to stabilise and then reduce cohort 
size.  
Swollen cohorts of young people entering the working age population pose a huge challenge for 
sufficient job creation. Where policy and institutional contexts are unfavourable and the 
educational system poorly attuned to the job market, the consequence is high unemployment 
among young people and blighted aspirations. Conversely, when conditions are favourable and 
the job market buoyant, youth bulges are part of the “demographic dividend” and a force for rapid 
economic growth. 
SSA is in an earlier stage of demographic transition than other regions. A rapidly increasing 
share of the world’s children will be born into the region registering the slowest pace of poverty 
reduction. A report by Watkins and Quattri presents a scenario for child poverty in 2030 (Watkins 
& Quattri, 2016). Merging demographic data with a World Bank poverty scenario, detailed 
regional and age profiles for extreme poverty are development. Key findings include: 
 Around 22% of sub-Saharan Africa’s children – 147.7 million in total – will be living below 
the $1.90 poverty threshold (including 46.3 million in the 0-4 age group) 
 These children will account for 43% of total global extreme poverty – almost twice the 
level in 2012 
 The region will account for almost 90% of extreme poverty among the world’s children, 
up from around 50% today 
 Modest levels of redistribution in which the incomes of the poorest 40% rise at 2 
percentage points above the average, would lift significant numbers of sub-Saharan 
African children above the poverty threshold: projected child poverty for sub-Saharan 
Africa in our scenario falls by 68 million, or almost 50%. 
This paper shows that the region’s distinctive mix of demography, inequality and initial poverty 
points towards a large gap between SDG ambition and prospective outcomes, with Africa’s 
children at the heart of that gap. Economic growth is unlikely to close the SDG gap entirely. Yet 
with better equitable distribution, investments in human capital, reproductive health care and 
social protection, it could generate a twin benefit in the form of an accelerated demographic 
transition with a more rapid reduction in child poverty.  
The adult population: employment, productivity and poverty 
The implications of population change in sub-Saharan Africa for employment, productivity, and 
poverty-reduction is a huge and contested subject, to which justice cannot be done in this report. 
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The UN projections indicate an increase over the next 35 years of those aged 20-64 years of 
164% for the region, from 416 to 1,100 million between 2015 and 2050. Because of high fertility 
in the past, the growth of the adult population will be faster than for the total population. Thus, the 
support ratio, the number in the prime working ages relative to less productive younger and older 
people, will improve, giving rise to the possibility of a demographic dividend. According to U.S. 
based economists---including Bloom, Kelly and Canning-- such favourable changes in age 
structure in East Asia accounted for 20-30% of the rapid economic growth in the region. 
However, all the papers on this subject stress that any major benefit is conditional on conducive 
policies, parallel improvements in education and training, and increased investment from 
domestic savings or foreign sources. Moreover, the fertility declines, and changes in support 
ratios, were much sharper than have occurred in Africa so far. It may be the case that the 
demographic signal will continue to be too weak in Africa to exert a profound influence on 
economic prospects. But, as shown for Ethiopia and Rwanda, accelerated fertility declines are 
possible. 
The following narrative is from Cleland 2017 (Cleland, 2017). Reliable information on current 
employment and livelihoods is scarce because few African countries have conducted labour 
force surveys and because of inherent measurement difficulties in settings where subsistence 
farming and informal activities dominate. Yet World Bank and ILO sources provide a reasonably 
consistent picture. About 65% rely on farming for their main occupation, about 20% are in the 
non-agricultural informal sector, mainly self-employed and working in small family enterprises, 
while close to 15% are wage earners. Most wage earners work in the sales and service sector; 
only 2-3% are employed in the industrial sector (manufacturing, mining, construction and public 
utilities). The share of wage earners in the public sector has been falling and is now estimated to 
be about 40%, though higher in resource rich countries. 
Among wage earners, the disappointing feature is the very small proportion employed in the 
industrial sector and particularly in manufacturing. Indeed, Africa’s share of global manufacturing 
exports fell from 2% to 1% between 1992 and 2012 whereas East Asia’s rose from 30% to 58% 
(UNIDO, 2013). Along with low agricultural productivity, the weakness of industrial sector 
employment distinguishes Africa most sharply from low and low-middle income countries in other 
regions. Whereas about 11% of the labour force in low income Bangladesh and Cambodia have 
an industrial wage the equivalent in low income African countries is 2.3%.  For low-middle 
income countries in Africa, the proportion is 2% compared with a range from 5.4% in Laos to 
over 14% in Vietnam (L Fox, Haines, Huerta Muñoz, & Thomas, 2013).  
There are, however, positive features. As noted earlier GDP growth has been impressive and by 
no means confined to resource-rich countries. The poverty headcount has fallen from 57% in 
2000 to 43% in 2012. Despite the region’s declining share of global manufacturing, the value of 
manufacturing rose from $73 to $98 billion between 2005 and 2014, at constant prices. The 
absolute number of jobs in manufacturing also increased though this is not reflected in share of 
employment because the labour force grew by 10 million a year between 2000 and 2015 (Balchin 
et al., 2016). It is also likely that conventional employment statistics do not provide a valid 
impression of positive changes in Africa because they do not consider multiple income sources. 
A detailed analysis of Uganda is revealing (L. Fox & Pimhidzai, 2011). Despite impressive and 
sustained annual GDP growth of 8%, an exclusive focus on primary employment shows little 
change. But a more comprehensive examination of livelihoods reveals a clear trend towards 
income diversification and a shift away from subsistence agriculture. Between 1992 and 2009, 
the percent of rural households having a non-farm enterprise increased from 24% to 40%. Over 
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the same period, farmers widened the range of crops grown and became more commercial. In 
the view of the authors these subtle changes, undetected by conventional surveys, account for 
the large drop in the poverty head count. 
To achieve welfare improvements against a back drop of very rapid increases in the working age 
population African countries need to make simultaneous progress on three fronts: improvement 
of agricultural productivity; creation of manufacturing jobs on a far larger scale than in the past; 
and encouragement of entrepreneurship in the informal sector. Unless this three-fold progress is 
made, the doubling of population in the next 35 years will entrench poverty and hunger. 
Much has been written on the steps necessary to improve agricultural productivity and the long 
list includes: greater investment to improve seed varieties, increased use of fertilisers, more 
astute crop rotation and diversification, enhanced water capture and storage, better 
infrastructure, and access to credit and markets. Particular optimism has been expressed about 
the potential of digital technology to better link small farmers to the wider world by providing 
them, for instance, with information about market prices. The route to progress is well lit. Climate 
change is the most obvious threat. Most farmers in Africa will remain vulnerable to erratic rainfall 
and temperature increases will be damaging to yields in the tropics. 
Historically, the pathway out of national poverty has involved a massive expansion of 
manufacturing, together with improvements in agricultural productivity. Manufacturing has been 
the main engine of economic growth and technological progress in poor countries. It makes a 
larger contribution to GDP per worker than the service sector, except for tradable services 
(mainly finance and the professions). Moreover, manufacturing has a multiplier effect in terms of 
employment; each job in manufacturing generates two to three jobs in other sectors (UNIDO, 
2013). 
As noted above, Africa’s economic progress in the past 15 years has not been driven by 
manufacturing, a feature that raises doubts about sustainability. The crucial question is whether 
African countries can exploit their growing and increasingly urban labour force to develop a 
thriving manufacturing base. Past and future trends in the number of global jobs in manufacturing 
is uncertain. According to the World Bank (UNIDO, 2013; World Bank, 2012), the number has 
risen only slightly since 1990 and is currently about 200 million; increased production has been 
largely the result of productivity gains. If valid, this implies that Africa must wrest jobs away from 
Asia. UNIDO (2013), however, considers jobs in the informal sector and related services (often 
outsourced by manufacturers) and estimates that manufacturing and related jobs rose from 
about 400 to about 500 million between 1995 and 2009. The 2009 estimate comprises 200 
million in the formal sector, an equal number in the informal sector and 100 million in related 
services. UNIDO’s more comprehensive assessment may be correct but it is unlikely that 
informal sector jobs have the same advantages as formal jobs in terms of productivity, earnings 
and wider advantages for the economy. Rapid application of automation and robotics adds a 
further uncertainty about the prospects of manufacturing to absorb the labour force. 
Many factors will determine the future of manufacturing in Africa, including infrastructure, relative 
wages and skills of the labour force, size of the domestic market, a coastline for exports by sea, 
capital for investment conducive policies. It may seem predictable that manufacturing will migrate 
to Africa, as wages rise in China and other parts of Asia, just as it earlier migrated from Europe 
and North America to Asia. That prospect is reasonable in the more distant future but, in the 
more immediate future, the prospect is uncertain. 
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Even with an optimistic view about the creation of private-sector wage-earning jobs, the creation 
of such jobs will be unable to match the sharp increases in the adult population. A very large 
fraction of the working age population will remain in the non-agricultural informal sector. An IMF 
working paper concluded that “even with non-agricultural growth as rapid and labor intensive as 
occurred in the last 20 years in East Asia, a similar employment transition will not occur. The 
enterprises would not be able to absorb the same share of the labor force because the labor 
force would just be too big” (L Fox et al., 2013). The same paper shows that, even under 
extremely optimistic assumptions about industrial growth, employment in the short term will 
continue to be dominated by agriculture and the informal sector. In Uganda an impressive 
100,000 non-agricultural jobs were created each year between 2002 and 2005, but there were 
400,000 new entrants to the labour force, leading to a generalised conclusion that at best only 
one-quarter of young people leaving school in Africa will find a wage job (Filmer, 2014; L. Fox & 
Pimhidzai, 2011). 
These considerations underscore the key role of small family enterprises and self-employment to 
Africa’s economic future. Conducive policies can help, for instance by enhancing access to 
credit, but much will depend on the ingenuity, hard work, and entrepreneurial abilities of 
individuals.  
The ageing population 
The proportionate increase in the population aged 65 and over in sub-Saharan Africa will be very 
high: from 30 million in 2015 to 104 million in 2015 according to UN projections. There are more 
women aged 60 years and over than men in the population (Pillay & Maharaj, 2012). However, at 
older ages a far greater percentage of men are married than women. Labour force participation 
of those aged 60 years and over remains high, but men tend to dominate the elderly workforce. 
In terms of geographical distribution, the older population are evenly dispersed between rural and 
urban areas. Life expectancy will increase in all regions of the continent. However, the fastest 
growth of the ageing population will occur in Northern Africa, followed by Southern Africa. The 
ageing population of Africa will grow at an accelerated rate over the next few decades, however, 
as a fraction of total population, the increase will only be modest, from 3% to 5%. It is thus 
debatable, given other pressing concerns, how much attention the plight of the elderly should 
receive in this region. 
In non-African DFID priority countries, population ageing is an important issue. In Myanmar, 
Jordan, and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, the old age dependency ratio, the number of people aged 
65+ per hundred of working age, is expected to rise from around 10% to over 20% between 2015 
and mid-century. 
Globally, nearly 80% of the elderly have no access to pension benefits. Thus, social protection of the elderly is 
increasingly an urgent necessity in many developing countries, particularly in Asia where coverage rates of 
contributory pension insurance schemes are low (Handayani, 2013). In the absence of adequate social 
protection programmes, the elderly continues to work or rely on family or community support. However, this 
support may be changing in the face of urbanization, industrialization and socio-cultural changes in the region.  
One approach to tackling old-age poverty is social pensions. In contrast to contributory pension schemes or 
tax-financed schemes for relatively privileged groups such as civil servants, both of which are earnings-
related, social pensions are flat rate benefits financed out of general revenues, which aim to reduce poverty 
and secure a minimum income for elderly. Qualitative assessment of the impact of social pensions in several 
countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand and Viet Nam shows that social pensions contribute 
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significantly to basic needs expenditure of older persons, including cost of food, healthcare and expenses 
associated with social and ceremonial activities. The pension has also been associated with improved well-
being and self-esteem. 
However, the benefit size of social pensions in these four countries is not sufficient to meet all the basic needs 
of the recipients. The monthly allowance is ranging from $3.60 in Bangladesh or one-fifth of the 
country poverty line to $9.50 in Viet Nam, which constitutes only 60% of the national minimum 
living standard. Despite the positive contribution of social pensions to older people’s livelihood, 
they must undoubtedly continue to rely on support from their children, extended families and 
communities. And as evidence from Viet Nam suggests, many older people are often compelled 
to work in agriculture to supplement their pensions. 
The demographic dividend that contributed substantially to economic growth in developing Asia in the past is 
diminishing. Population ageing affects growth through savings, capital accumulation, labour force participation 
and total factor productivity (TFP). A report by Park and Shin examined the impact of aging on those four 
channels in 12 developing Asian economies that collectively make up the bulk of the region’s population and 
output (Park & Shin, 2011). Projections about the impact of demographic change (old-age and youth 
dependency ratios) on the future economic growth rate of per capita GDP of these 12 countries from 2011 to 
2020 and from 2021 to 2030 were made. There is diversity among the 12 economies with respect to the size 
and timing of demographic effects on economic growth. In Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; 
and Singapore where population aging is well under way, demography will already have a 
negative impact on growth in 2011–2020, i.e., they will pay a demographic tax rather than earn a 
demographic dividend in the immediate future. In the PRC, Taipei China, Thailand, and Viet Nam 
where aging began at a later stage, demographic impacts will still be positive from 2011 to 2020 
but will turn negative in 2021–2030. India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines will 
continue to reap a demographic dividend in 2021–2030; however, even in those youthful 
economies the dividend will be visibly smaller in 2021–2030 relative to 2011–2020.The results 
indicate that there will be a sizable adverse economic impact where population aging is more advanced. 
5. Implication of population change for service provision 
and human capital 
According to the UN medium projection for sub-Saharan Africa, the number of children of primary 
and secondary school age, 5 to 19 years, will rise by almost 90 percent, from 359 million in 2015 
to 668 million in 2050. Improvements in health and education (human capital) are key to social 
and economic progress but increasing populations apply increasing pressure on health and 
education provision. Most African countries are not training enough physicians, nurses, midwives 
and skilled birth attendants to cope with increasing birth rates. To achieve universal primary 
schooling and educate increased numbers of children an extra 3.3 million primary teachers will 
be required (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, October 2013). Demand for secondary school 
places will increase as growing numbers graduate from primary school and an extra 5.1 million 
teachers will be required to achieve universal lower secondary education by 2030 (UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, October 2013). However, secondary schooling is more expensive than 
primary schooling with government budget allocations often insufficient to meet demand. 
Maintaining and improving quality of schooling must not be compromised in the pursuit of 
universal education but is vulnerable to the large increase in the school-aged populations.  
Not all DFID priority countries are faced with this strain on educational provision. In Myanmar, for 
instance, fertility has been falling for several decades and is now estimated to be about 2.5 births 
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per woman. Fertility decline is projected to continue. Thus, the projected school age population, 
5-19 years, will fall slightly between 2015 and 2050. This provides an opportunity for the country 
to strengthen the quality of education and training. Such investment is claimed to partially 
account for the success of the “Asian tiger” economies. 
Returning to Africa, the large projected population increase poses similar strains on health 
provision as it does for education. Most African countries are not training enough physicians, 
nurses and midwives. A detailed examination of 12 countries found that six were not training 
sufficient health staff at all three levels to maintain existing absolute numbers and only three 
were training sufficient nurses and midwives to replace those leaving the labour force. Four 
countries were on track to increase numbers but not sufficiently to match population increase. 
Only two countries were likely to improve the ratio of staff to population (Kinfu, Dal Poz, Mercer, 
& Evans, 2009). The 59 percent projected increase in the number of infants and young children 
will pose a strain on health budgets and staff. It is estimated that the health work force would 
need to increase by 10 percent per year to meet demand for health care between now and 2030, 
a rate of growth far higher than in other developing regions (World Health Organization, 2016). 
6. Inequality and vulnerability 
Climate change 
Climate change has the potential to damage the lives of many people around the globe: severe 
droughts, rising sea levels, food insecurity and the increased incidence of extreme weathers 
pose a threat to millions. Certain regions and groups are more exposed than others. Climate 
change, and the consequences thereof, are inequality issues, as they are likely to hit some of the 
poorest countries in the world the hardest. Sea level rises in places such as Bangladesh, 
stronger hurricanes in the Caribbean and droughts on the African continent will be compounded 
by a lack of infrastructure and/or the lack of the strong institutional governance necessary to 
mitigate the damage. Governments will need to play a significant role in reducing the damage of 
climate change to the poorest, most marginalised and most vulnerable groups within their 
populations. 
 
Evidence is increasing that climate change is taking the largest toll on poor and vulnerable 
people, and these impacts are largely caused by inequalities that increase the risks from climate 
hazards (United Nations DESA, 2016). Poor families occupy the least desirable land, land that is 
more vulnerable to effects of climate change such as mud slides, water contamination and 
flooding. Climate change is also a major factor for intergenerational inequality. Future 
generations will have fewer resources, such as water, forests or fertile soils. They will also have 
less safely inhabitable land than we have today and be disadvantaged by broader ecological 
changes, which will have led to significantly less animal and plant diversity. 
Food security 
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa have been importing increasing amounts of food. Since the 
1970s Africa has been a net importer of food; between 1980 and 2007, net imports in real terms 
grew at 3.4 percent per year (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, & Paschali, 2011). Population growth, and 
changing dietary preferences among the urban population, rather than increased consumption 
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per head, accounts for most of this trend. While richer countries, such as Botswana and Gabon, 
import more per head of population than poor countries, all but a handful of poorer African 
countries are net importers. On average, 31 percent of cereals consumed in 2008 were imported 
(African Development Bank Group, 2009). Recent estimates of the total value of food imports 
range between US $30 and 50 billion per year. 
Increased food imports coexist with widespread under-nutrition. While there has been modest 
improvement since the early 1990s, it is estimated that 25 percent of Africa’s population was 
undernourished 2011-13, higher than any other developing region (FAO, 2013). Most of 
countries with alarming measures on the global hunger index are in Africa (IFPRI (International 
Food Policy Research Institute), 2014). Nutritional gains have been sharper in Southern, South-
Eastern and Eastern Asia than in Africa. 
Africa is a predominantly rural, agricultural region. About two-thirds of employment derives from 
agriculture. Yet the population has become increasingly dependent on food imports and hunger 
remains widespread with little improvement over the past 20 years. The reasons for this 
disastrous conjunction are manifold and have been widely analysed. Whereas most Asian 
countries benefitted from the Green Revolution that transformed agricultural yields, no such leap 
forward occurred in Africa; yields per hectare have remained static and domestic production has 
barely kept pace with population increase by extending cropland. Between 1985 and 2005, 
cereal production grew by 65 percent but population increased by 71 percent (Jayne & al., 2010). 
Little research has been done into genetic improvement of some key African crops, such as 
sorghum, millet, and teff. Use of fertilisers, irrigation and mechanisation are extremely low. Rural 
infrastructure is poor and thus marketing of surplus production is difficult. Access to credit for 
farmers has been very limited.  Only in the last decade has it been acknowledged that agriculture 
has been scandalously neglected in development policies (World Bank, 2007). 
The region now faces a further doubling of population in the next 35 years. Food availability must 
increase to a similar degree just to maintain existing nutritional standards and by more if under-
nutrition is to be reduced. Though enhanced food availability does not guarantee reduced 
hunger, particularly in the urban population where economic access is crucial, it is an essential 
precondition. Nor do the nutritional needs of growing populations necessarily have to be met by 
domestic production but the costs of escalating food imports would be a severe and probably 
unsustainable burden on all but the few wealthier countries. 
The big question is therefore whether agricultural production in Africa can more than double 
between now and mid-century. Baseline yields are so low that addressing the barriers mentioned 
above provide a potential for rapid improvements. Taking into account availability of virgin land 
and assuming a doubling of yields, Alexandratos (Alexandratos, 2005) calculates that the 
majoriity of 11 African countries with particularly high population growth could increase cereal 
production per head by 2050. However, several major and less tractable obstacles to progress 
can be identified: continued growth of the rural population poses an obvious risk of over-cropping 
and over-grazing, leading to further soil degradation and erosion; climate change, as already 
mentioned; the preponderance of very small scale farmers and insecurity of land security which 
may inhibit risky innovation. 
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7. Migration 
International migration is the most politically sensitive of all demographic topics. Partly for this 
reason, the scale of future migration is impossible to forecast with any confidence and most 
projections simply assume that recent flows will continue at the same level. Though most 
migration takes place within regions, the literature deals mainly with the consequences of 
migration from poor to rich countries. The population of less developed regions are currently 
growing annually by 66 million and it is estimated that about 4 million migrate to richer regions 
per year. It is thus clear that international migration cannot act as an important safety valve to 
relieve the pressure of increasing numbers in poor countries but they can benefit from 
remittances and the expertise and new ideas that returning migrants bring. Remittances are far 
greater than Official Development Assistance and make a particularly large contribution to GDP 
in three DFID priority countries: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Nepal. Set against these benefits is 
the loss of the best educated and most enterprising individuals. Many economists regard the flow 
of people from countries with surplus labour forces to countries where the labour force is set to 
fall as most inevitable and beneficial to both sending and receiving countries (World Bank Group, 
2016). The benefits to sending countries can be increased by ensuring that migrant workers 
enjoy the same employment conditions as native workers, by reducing the transaction costs of 
remittances and by encouraging the eventual return of migrants to their countries of origin. 
An increasing number of people are being forcibly displaced (refugees, asylum seekers and 
internally displaced persons), reaching 65.3 million individuals by the end of 2015; a 75 percent 
increase from 37.3 million in 1996 (UNHCR, 2015). From 1999 to 2011 this population remained 
relatively stable but then dramatically increased since then coinciding with the beginning of the 
‘Arab Spring’ and the Syrian conflict. Other unresolved crises and conflicts, as well as new ones 
that arose during the year, also contributed to the increase in global forced displacement. These 
included new or reignited conflicts in Burundi, Iraq, Libya, Niger, and Nigeria, together with older 
or unresolved crises in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, South Sudan, and Yemen. Most the world’s refugees – nine out of ten – are hosted in the 
global South, led by Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon. Half are children and half come from just 
three war-torn countries – Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia.  
It is likely that rapid population increase in Africa will result in large-scale cross border 
movements of population, because of Malthusian pressures and failed states. Niger, with a 
projected increase of population from 20 million to 72 million by mid-century, is an extreme 
example of population problems in the Sahel. It is difficult to imagine the country being able to 
support such an increase, even at the lowest standard of living, and also difficult to envisage 
indefinite international food aid on such a scale. The obvious remedy is mass migration to 
neighbouring countries and it is uncertain whether this can happen without civil strife 
Not all migration is ‘distress-driven’ but can offer an escape route out of poverty. Official census 
and sample surveys tend to underestimate the extent of temporary migration and commuting by 
poor people seeking employment opportunities in distant locations, increasingly facilitated by 
better roads and communication networks (Deshingkar & Anderson, 2004). Deshingkar et al 
recommends that policy needs to become more flexible to provide services to people who are on 
the move, including e.g. access to crucial information on labour markets and rights, as well as 
basic services in health, education, shelter and food (Deshingkar & Anderson, 2004). 
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8. Urbanisation 
The proportion of people living in urban areas is expected to increase from 54 percent of the 
world’s population in 2014 to 66 percent in 2050 (United Nations, 2014). Africa and Asia remain 
mostly rural with 40 and 48 percent of respective populations living in urban areas, although 
Africa and Asia are expected to urbanise faster than other regions and are projected to become 
56 and 64 percent urban respectively, by 2050. Continuing population growth and urbanization 
are projected to add 2.5 billion people to the world’s urban population by 2050, with nearly 90 per 
cent of the increase concentrated in Asia and Africa. Just three countries, India, China and 
Nigeria, together are expected to account for 37 percent of the projected growth of the world’s 
urban population between 2014 and 2050. There is great diversity in the characteristics of the 
world’s urban environs: close to half of urban dwellers reside in relatively small settlements of 
less than 500,000 inhabitants, while nearly one in eight live in the 28 mega-cities of 10 million 
inhabitants or more. The number of mega-cities has nearly tripled since 1990; and by 2030, 41 
urban agglomerations are projected to house at least 10 million inhabitants each. Whereas 
several decades ago most of the world’s largest urban agglomerations were found in the more 
developed regions, today’s large cities are concentrated in the global South, and the fastest-
growing agglomerations are medium sized cities and cities with 500,000 to 1 million inhabitants 
located in Asia and Africa. Some cities have experienced population decline through low-fertility, 
economic contraction and natural disasters. Integrated polices to improve the lives of both urban 
and rural dwellers are needed. 
As the world, has transformed including through rising inequality, increasing insecurity, widening 
impacts of climate change, advances in life expectancy, information and communications 
technology, governance and human knowledge, cities have been a primary area where this 
change has taken place. Persistent urban issues over the last 20 years include urban growth, 
changes in family patterns, growing number of urban residents living in slums and informal 
settlements and the challenge of providing urban services. Connected to these persistent urban 
issues are emerging urban issues including climate change, exclusion and rising inequality, rising 
insecurity and an upsurge in international migration (United Nations Human Settlement 
Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2016).  
Cities are important drivers of economic and social development and improved quality of life for 
all, when well-managed. However, rapid and unplanned urban growth threatens sustainable 
development (United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2016). Many cities 
are grossly unprepared for the challenges associated with urbanization. Today urban areas are 
more unequal than rural areas and hundreds of millions of the worlds urban poor live in sub-
standard conditions. The New Urban Agenda agreed on at the United Nations Conference on 
Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) in 2016 should promote cities and 
human settlements that are environmentally sustainable, resilient, socially inclusive, safe and 
violence-free and economically productive; and better connected to and contributing towards 
sustained rural transformation. This is in-line with Goal 11 of the SDGs: to make cities and 
human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Good governance is required to 
achieve this and encompasses strong effective leadership, land-use planning, jurisdictional 
coordination, inclusive citizen participation in the design of infrastructure and efficient financing to 
help foster urban responses to climate change.  
Living conditions of Africa’s urban population is of particular concern. The percent of all urban 
dwellers in this region living in slum conditions has fallen only slightly from 70% in 1990 to 55.2% 
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in 2014 (Division, 2015). In contrast, 30% of the urban population in Southern Asia live in slums. 
Africa’s urban population is projected to double in the next 20 years and the pressure on urban 
housing and infrastructure will be relentless. While it is possible that large and growing 
concentrations of young people will act as a magnet for inward investment to support 
manufacturing, the danger is that slums, largely composed of people living in poverty on the 
margins of the urban economy, will proliferate. The threat to social cohesion of increasing 
numbers of slum dwellers living close to small affluent elites is obvious. 
Keats and Wiggins reviewed population in rural areas of the developing world to identify patterns 
of change, the drivers of these changes and to assess what this may mean for policy for 
agricultural and rural development (Keats & Wiggins, 2016). To explore changes at country level, 
sixteen relatively populous developing countries from Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa were selected. It is expected that between 2015 and 2030 
the world’s rural population will peak at about 3.3 billion and then decline.  
Key messages from this report are as follows: 
- Growth in rural areas is slowing in Africa and declining in East Asia, Southeast Asia and 
Latin America. Policies to reduce rural population growth include family planning, poverty 
reduction, health improvements and schooling for girls.  
- Fertility and mortality rates have been falling in rural areas. Lower fertility and less child 
mortality empowers women. Fertility and mortality tends to be higher in rural than urban 
areas largely owing to high mortality of children under age five (although this may not be 
the case when compared to informal urban settlements). The combination of higher 
mortality and fertility delays the demographic transition in rural areas so that rates of 
natural population growth in rural areas are usually higher than those in urban areas 
- The proportion of the rural population in working years is rising potentially delivering a 
demographic dividend. However, labour shortages are emerging in some rural areas, 
pushing up rural wages and encouraging mechanization. Facilitating transfer of rights to 
operate land are indicated in these areas. 
- Most rural areas experience net out-migration. Education of people living rurally 
encourages such movement. Policies to discourage migration tends to raise costs and 
dangers to migrants and should instead facilitate movement providing good information 
and allow transfer of citizens rights from rural to urban locality.  The population of cities 
thus grows faster than the rural population, despite the underlying more rapid increases 
in rural areas. 
Nearly 1 million people live in slums and this number is expected to double by 2030. People in 
slums have much worse health than those in non-slum urban areas, which in part can be 
attributed to “neighbourhood effects” (Ezeh et al., 2017). The “urban bias” in favour of urban 
areas does not extend to slums – people living in some slums have worse health than the rural 
poor. This may not be the case for those with short stay times in slum areas, however, those who 
remain in slums can enter a downward spiral of ill health and financial distress. Slums offer high 
returns on investment because beneficial effects are shared across many people in densely 
populated neighbourhoods. The authors of a recently published paper argue that, in all low-
income and middle-income countries census tracts should be designated slum or non-slum to 
inform local policy and provide a basis for research surveys that build on censuses (Lilford et al., 
2017).  
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Expert contributors 
Sadly, Professor Hans Rosling was unable to contribute to this report. Prof Rosling was an 
“edutainer” who presented facts and figures with passion to educate the world about global 
health, population growth, poverty reduction and trends in human development. The following are 
just a few links to his exemplary work. 
Complexity of Population and Resource Issues 
http://www.filmsforaction.org/watch/hans-rosling-brilliantly-explains-complexity-of-population-and-
resources-issues-using-simple-tools/ 
Don’t panic - how to end poverty in 15 years 
https://www.gapminder.org/videos/dont-panic-end-poverty/ 
Tedtalk: The best stats you’ve ever seen 
https://www.ted.com/talks/hans_rosling_shows_the_best_stats_you_ve_ever_seen 
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